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WESTERN EUROPE REVIEW

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UK: How Long Will the Government Survive?

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During the last six months, Prime Minister Callaghan and his minority Labor government have survived--despite a unified Conservative/Liberal effort to oust him--because of his skill at political maneuvering and because the minor parties supporting him have wanted to avoid a general election. But Callaghan's ability to manipulate Parliament is likely to diminish because of an erosion of small party support for the government. This makes a spring election, in which the government will be seeking a popular mandate on its economic policies, increasingly probable.

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The Parliamentary Test

For much of Prime Minister Callaghan's nearly three years in office, he has headed a minority Labor government that has frequently appeared on the verge of collapse. He has been able to survive by improving the economy, harnessing trade union discontent, keeping the Tory opposition off guard, arranging a formal--if somewhat strained--pact with the Liberals, and making ad hoc arrangements with other minor parties. But last summer, Callaghan's economic policies came under heavy fire, and the unions made it clear that negotiations in the fall would be difficult. Moreover, the Conservatives were attacking the government with renewed vigor, the Liberals--insisting that Callaghan go to the country--ended their support of the government, and support from other parties became increasingly tenuous.

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Believing Callaghan could not continue through the winter without a new mandate, most observers and all of the political parties expected him to schedule a fall election. When he postponed the election in September, the outraged Conservatives and Liberals set their sights on bringing the government down. The Tories have continued to pursue this goal without reservation, but the Liberals are having mixed feelings. Although they are openly committed to helping topple the government and


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are highly unlikely to form a new pact with Labor, the Liberals are expected to do very badly in a general election. They would therefore like time to attempt to rebuild their constituency and to let the Thorpe trial (set for the spring) recede in the voters' memories.



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The Electoral Test

The government will survive during the next several weeks and possibly months if the opposition Tories fail to attract enough minor party support for a no-confidence vote. Beyond that, however, whether Callaghan succeeds in calling elections at a time favorable to the Labor Party--and then wins--depends on the state of the economy and, more important, on the voters' perception of how well the Prime Minister is handling both the economy and the trade unions. Recent parliamentary defeats for the government's pay policy, union agitation for wage increases in excess of guidelines, and predictions that

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the economy will sour in 1979 have eroded voter confidence. To some extent, this is offset by Callaghan's popular attempts to deal firmly with the unions and by the Conservatives' inability--despite their well-orchestrated parliamentary opposition--to offer the voters clear and unified policies on pay and trade unions.

[REDACTED]

A Spring Election?

If Callaghan can avoid being tripped up in a confidence vote--something that will become increasingly difficult to do--his choice of a spring election date will depend on several key factors. Opinion polls, which played an important role in the Prime Minister's decision to postpone an election last fall, continue to fluctuate and probably will do so until polling day. The December polls, which were almost an exact reversal of those in November, once again had the Tories in the lead. As time passes, Callaghan increasingly will view the polls as a barometer of public support for his economic strategy, especially his pay policy. He will also rely on the polls to show whether the Liberals in England and the Nationalists in Scotland can be expected to lure back many of the voters they have lost over the past year; if not, much of that support will probably go to the Conservatives in an election. [REDACTED]


If a spring election is held, Callaghan will certainly wait at least until after the middle of February, when a registry of new voters will be published. The new registry will give the Laborites an opportunity--more important to them than to the Tories (who keep closer tabs on their supporters)--to identify and tap first-time voters and former supporters who have drifted away. But scheduling a polling day and launching an election campaign will be complicated by the devolution referendums to be held at the beginning of March, local elections during the first week of May, and the European Parliamentary elections the beginning of June. Although it is unusual to schedule elections for more than one constituency level on the same day, Callaghan, with one eye on the polls and the other on the unions, might find it advantageous and even necessary to double up. [REDACTED]

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A Fall Election?

If Callaghan can or wants to survive until next fall he must convince the minor parties that it is to their advantage to wait. He can do this only by assuring them that their electoral prospects will pick up over time or, in what seems a less likely move, by granting the expensive concessions that would entice the small parties. Also, he will have to keep the economy on track, primarily by curtailing inflation and unemployment, keeping union demands under control, and convincing the voters that his programs are working. The most likely date for a fall election would be early in October, although Callaghan could wait until as late as 15 November.



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Prospects for the Ecevit Government and for Turkish Democracy

Turkey has entered a difficult period that will test the cohesiveness of Prime Minister Ecevit's left-of-center government as well as the resiliency of its democratic institutions. Recognizing that inaction could be as dangerous as action for his precariously poised government, Ecevit took some significant but incomplete steps during his first year in office to turn Turkey's failing economy around and to curb its spiralling political violence. But these proved too little in the case of the economy and too late in the case of political violence.

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Consequently, Ecevit was compelled to declare martial law in 13 of Turkey's 67 provinces to curb the social unrest which originates in political, sectarian, and ethnic rivalries that are aggravated by the faltering economy. This has cost him much in political capital in his own party, given new opportunities to the opposition, and limited further his ability and probably his willingness to risk the hard decisions the economy requires. It has also reopened the possibility of a larger political role for the military.

Ecevit could secure some short-term maneuvering room if martial law works, but overall, its imposition may add to the many other problems facing his government and contribute in the end to its fall. Should this occur, prospects for the emergence of a government more able and willing to confront Turkey's domestic and foreign policy problems are not encouraging. The result may be active involvement by the military in the political process, and as a last resort, perhaps another temporary experiment in direct military rule.

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An In-Charge Image and Reality

Ecevit was reluctant to declare martial law on ideological and political grounds. It was only when a majority of his party and cabinet, and possibly the military, came

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out in its favor that he relented. He has since moved quickly to portray it as a decisive and necessary step that will be applied impartially and with due regard for principles of civilian supremacy and democratic due process. And there is little doubt that the majority of Turks have welcomed the move as long overdue. Yet in private, Ecevit is said to be bitter that he has been forced to do the extreme right's bidding and concerned that his ability to govern has been compromised. He has already succumbed to party pressure to sack his Interior Minister. [REDACTED]

The majority in Ecevit's Republican Peoples Party (RPP) who supported martial law hope it will free the government to deal with the economy after which Ecevit and the RPP will emerge with a healthier image. The 63 members of the party's increasingly truculent left wing who voted against it in the party caucus are much less sanguine. Their concern is that martial law will fall heaviest against the left--as in the 1971-73 period--and will ultimately fortify the right. Ecevit will find it difficult to reassure both groups if the implementation of martial law requires progressively more stringent measures, and this could weaken him further. Indeed, in what appears to be the first political fallout from the martial law issue, an RPP deputy from eastern Turkey resigned temporarily from the party and left it with only a one seat majority before he was persuaded to return. [REDACTED]

Opposition Glee

The opposition parties have generally ignored the threat to democratic principles inherent in martial law and have sought to exploit its imposition to the fullest for partisan gain. Despite their unanimous approval of the decision in Parliament, they have portrayed Ecevit as a weak and vacillating leader who allowed events to get out of hand. Recognizing that the issue of civilian-military relations is a sensitive one within Ecevit's party, they have taunted him for restricting the prerogatives of the martial law authorities. Suleyman Demirel, leader of the main opposition Justice Party, who was himself ousted by the military in 1971 for failing to stop political violence, introduced a motion of censure in parliament that was subsequently defeated 226-210 and announced that he is placing his trust in the armed forces. [REDACTED]

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Alpaslan Turkes, who heads the neo-fascist National Action Party which is behind most of the violence that is rightist-inspired, is making much of the fact that leftist-dominated provinces were deliberately excluded from the martial law list and has called for the inclusion of seven additional provinces. Turkes was a main participant in the 1960 military intervention, and he has made no secret of his desire for yet another military takeover to stop the alleged drift of the government and Turkish society toward Communism. [REDACTED]

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Only Necmettin Erbakan's Islamic-oriented National Salvation Party (NSP), which wants to leave open the possibility of a revival of the 1974 coalition with Ecevit's party, has hedged its criticism of the government. It was an NSP vote that enabled Ecevit to defeat Demirel's censure motion. Although the opposition parties may themselves not deem it propitious to return to power during this troubled period, their all-out effort to bring Ecevit down is not likely to abate. [REDACTED]

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The Politicians and the Military

The extent to which Ecevit simultaneously can keep his party in line and weather the continuing onslaught from the opposition will depend on how civilian-military relations evolve and how effective the military is in reducing violence. Recognizing this, Ecevit has moved swiftly to assure civilian supremacy by such devices as daily meetings with General Staff Chief Evren, formation of a cabinet level martial law coordination board, and weekly meetings with provincial martial law commanders. Ecevit hopes these will prevent a repeat of the 1971-73 excesses and mollify those in his party who distrust the military, while also discrediting opposition charges that he is weak. [REDACTED]

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The military has other imperatives. Having committed their prestige, the main concern of military commanders will be to get the job done even if it means exceeding their authority. To what extent this leads to increased strains between military and civilian leaders will depend as much on the reaction of extremists to martial law as to the capabilities of Turkey's no-nonsense military. If the extremists are cowed and a modicum of peace ensues, Ecevit will have bought time to deal with the many other problems that face him. [REDACTED]

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If Martial Law Works

Prospects that martial law will quell political violence in Turkey are considerably more favorable than in neighboring Iran. Having intervened twice before in the political process, the Turkish military has had substantial experience in crowd control methods and law enforcement. Turkish extremists on the left and right feud with each other and the bulk of their activities are not directly aimed at the government. Nor have Turkish extremist leaders been willing openly to inspire and incite their followers to commit acts of violence. Indeed, Turkes denies even having a connection with rightist activists. Moreover, the extreme left is divided among several disparate factions and Islam is not as strong a political force despite the resurgence of anti-secular sentiment in Turkey. Perhaps the most important difference is that Turkey's democratic institutions are able to channel most discontent into constructive give and take. [REDACTED]

Even if the military curbs political violence, however, martial law will not eradicate its underlying causes. These are the product of the transitional stage of social, political, and economic development that Turkey is in and are difficult to contain except by authoritarian measures. Having instituted martial law, Ecevit will find it difficult to lift it gracefully. This will add another contentious issue to those that could endanger his flimsy two-seat majority in the coming months. Others include the worsening economy, the budget debate in late February, the RPP biennial convention in April, and the senatorial elections in June. [REDACTED]

And If It Fails

It is also possible that the martial law issue could be a determining as well as a contributing factor in bringing Ecevit down. Even where the level of violence is reduced, there is always the danger that an incident could trigger mass rioting. And since the state has visibly stepped in to stop intergroup violence, such unrest could assume an anti-government character. This would be especially serious were it to occur in the large cities which have extensive so-called gecekond areas where the urban poor and newly arrived migrants reside. [REDACTED]

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Violence might also increase precipitately in areas not covered by martial law where extremists will find it less costly to carry on their trade. The cost-benefit ratio, moreover, is apt to incline extremists to aim for more prominent targets that may ultimately include foreigners, particularly Americans. And since at least the extreme right actually wants another military takeover, it may continue and even escalate its activities. Ecevit would then face conflicting pressures in which centrists in his party, independent cabinet members, and the military might press for an expansion of the scope and intensity of martial law while his party's left wing might balk. Under such circumstances, the chances are high that the Ecevit government would fall, especially if the economy continued its downward slide and prospects for an international rescue effort were not promising. [REDACTED]

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Successor Governments

Should his government collapse, Ecevit might go into opposition, but he might also try to revive his earlier coalition with Erbakan's NSP. Such an alliance would again be a marriage of convenience, but despite their abhorrence for each other and essential domestic and foreign policy differences, the two parties do share some economic goals and the same social constituency in the poorer parts of the country. Nevertheless, an RPP-NSP coalition would be less cohesive than the present Ecevit government and less inclined to adopt austere economic measures, and it would pursue a more chauvinistic foreign policy. [REDACTED]

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Serious attention has also been given to an above-parties, technocratic government supported by majorities of the two major parties. Indeed, President Koruturk is reported to have taken soundings along those lines within Ecevit's own party before the declaration of martial law intervened. This option would have the attractions of the much vaunted "grand coalition" while avoiding the problem of getting Ecevit and Demirel to work together. Earlier technocratic governments have been reluctant to undertake major initiatives, however, and there is no guarantee that another one would not follow suit. [REDACTED]

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Other more distant possibilities include the revival of the conservative three-party coalition that preceded the Ecevit government. This would require the return to the Justice Party of those who defected to Ecevit as well as defections from the RPP, which does not seem likely given their abhorrence of Turkes' party. Should such a coalition emerge in any event, it would suffer from the same immobility that plagued it during its earlier stint in office. [REDACTED]

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There has also been talk about switching to a presidential system of government to avoid the deadlocks of a multiparty parliamentary system--either by persuading President Koruturk to use his existing powers and prestige more fully or by revising the constitution. Koruturk has refused, however, and the parties would be reluctant to give up the greater influence they enjoy under a parliamentary system. [REDACTED]

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The Praetorian Alternative

The combination of the Ataturkist tradition and its earlier unhappy attempt to govern the country thus far has inclined the military to stay out of politics. But military leaders have clearly been upset at the deepening economic and internal security crisis that threatens their law and order values as well as their corporate and individual economic interests. The military in fact owns and operates one of the country's largest economic conglomerates which supports its pension system and it therefore has a vested interest in domestic tranquility and a healthy economy. [REDACTED]

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Ecevit's declaration of martial law has now enhanced the possibility of a political role for the military since it will inevitably involve decisions having a political as well as a law enforcement content. Even before the martial law decision, the military declared its intention to "go public" concerning its many economic and morale problems, in part because of concern that Ecevit's "New Defense Concept" will entail a sharp reduction in next year's defense budget. In a manner reminiscent of the period before the 1960 intervention, General Staff Chief Evren criticized the parliament for hastily enacting legislation adversely affecting the morale and economic well-being of his officers. [REDACTED]

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Such sentiment and the expected civilian-military strains if political violence is not quelled could impel the military to be more assertive. And if the Ecevit government falls, the military might well deem it an opportune time to play at least a behind-the-scenes role in putting together a responsive and more effective successor. Should that prove impossible, another open military intervention cannot be excluded. [REDACTED]

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Outlook

The outlook for the Ecevit government is not promising, and prospects that Turkey will be able to solve its mounting problems without some deeper involvement by the military are only slightly better. Forced by events to spend a good deal of his remaining political capital to curb political violence, Ecevit will find it difficult to take the measures necessary to stop the related problem of the economy's downward slide and ensure needed international assistance. The same holds true for facing up to the quarrels with the Greeks over Cyprus, the Aegean, and NATO. [REDACTED]

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The decision to impose martial law, moreover, has launched Ecevit on a course from which it will be difficult to move forward or back without serious risk. Even if his government is not brought down by the martial law issue, its mounting problems and its minuscule majority do not bode well for its longevity. [REDACTED]

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At the same time, it is by no means certain that any successor government would have the strength or the will to do better, and some might well do worse in terms of Turkish and Western interests. Under such circumstances, the military at some point might involve itself more directly in the political process to provide that strength and will. And if that does not work, it may reluctantly take the reins of power itself. [REDACTED]

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A return to praetorian rule might ameliorate but would not solve Turkey's problems and could deal a sharp setback to democratic institutions. Nevertheless, in the longer term, some combination or alternation between democracy and authoritarianism seems a distinct possibility for Turkey as it traverses the socially disruptive transitional stage of modernization. [REDACTED]

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
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
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


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CSCE: Preparations for Valletta


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Politics is again taking center stage in preparations for "technical" CSCE deliberations. The Valletta conference, which convenes 13 February, is the last of three expert meetings to take place between CSCE follow-on sessions in Belgrade and Madrid, and is designed to discuss economic, scientific, and cultural cooperation in the Mediterranean. The presence of the so-called non-participating Mediterranean states (NPMS), including Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Syria, and Tunisia, however, could lead to the injection of difficult political issues regarding regional security.



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The NPMS issue has raised procedural problems with implications for the entire CSCE exercise. The executive secretary of the Valletta session has called for a special meeting in Geneva on 22 January to set terms for NPMS participation. The United States is lobbying against this meeting, claiming there is no precedent for the authority the executive secretary is trying to exercise and no allowance for it in CSCE rules. The NATO allies generally agree with the US arguments, but only Canada and Norway have expressed unqualified opposition to going to Geneva. Belgium, Denmark, France, West Germany, Italy, and the UK will agree to meet if it is understood that no CSCE precedent will be set and that no decisions will be reached regarding procedure at Valletta. Whether there is a Geneva meeting will probably depend on how strongly the United States pushes its opposition.



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Malta currently favors a formula under which the nonparticipating states would be permitted to address plenary sessions--as they did in Belgrade--and take part fully in committee work. This is a mild version of Prime Minister Mintoff's original plan to use the meeting as a step toward the creation of permanent security, economic, scientific, and cultural institutions in Malta. Besides pushing full participation for the Mediterranean states, Mintoff had hoped to invite observers from Persian Gulf

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countries and to make Arabic an official conference language. Romania, neutral/nonaligned states, and the West, however, objected to the threat to the consensus process posed by such an unwieldy gathering. While non-Mediterranean NATO states rejected Mintoff's plan out of hand, France, Italy, Portugal, Greece, and Turkey sympathized with linking European and Mediterranean security and challenged the West to define solutions to the problems he raised. [REDACTED]

Despite initial resistance from some northern states, particularly Norway, the EC Nine have accepted the latest Maltese formula. The Nine believe this should not set a precedent for future meetings, but they acknowledge that it could. There has been no specific Warsaw Pact reaction to Malta's NPMS formula, but Bulgaria has expressed opposition to NPMS participation and concern that security issues might be raised in Valletta. [REDACTED]

Malta sent invitations to the nonparticipating Mediterranean states and to Helsinki signatories at the same time. Only Israel and Algeria among the NPMS have so far accepted Malta's invitation to the conference. Tunisia is holding out for full participation. It does not appear that Israel's presence will prevent any state other than Libya from showing up. Israelis and Arabs attended a conference on solar energy in Valletta last October (Lebanon did not send representatives, but implied this was due to internal difficulties). If the Maltese formula is accepted, however, Arab states might raise security issues in plenary sessions. They could mix politics and technology over such questions as Israel's alleged refusal to share solar energy and desalinization information. The Arabs could also raise the issue of the anti-Israel resolutions of UNESCO, particularly since that organization will be represented in Valletta. [REDACTED]

Some NPMS could try to turn the meeting into a continuation of the North-South dialogue by urging that the issue of Mediterranean cooperation evolve in the direction of greater Western aid to less developed states in the region. Mintoff could then reopen discussion of his plan for Malta-based regional institutions or of his well-known hope that France, Italy, Algeria, and Libya will finance Malta's security when British troops leave the

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island in March. In addition, the conference will provide an early international appearance by post-Boumediene Algeria. Israel has expressed concern that Algeria would raise security issues in Valletta. Both Egypt and Israel would be uncomfortable if security problems are discussed. The Egyptians could use this unusual post - Camp David gathering of so many parties to the Middle East dispute to hint at future policy regarding peace negotiations.

[REDACTED]

The NPMS will certainly participate to some extent in the conference. The Helsinki accord called for cooperation with these states. Each of the NPMS except Libya made a contribution in Belgrade, and the Belgrade closing document called on them to "contribute" to the Valletta conference. The Belgrade document reserved discussion of Mediterranean security issues for the session in Madrid, and technical questions are likely to dominate Valletta deliberations. The contribution of nonparticipants, however, would set a precedent for future "technical" CSCE sessions and somewhat devalue the CSCE process.

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France-Guinea: Reconciliation and Cooperation

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French President Giscard's highly successful state visit to Guinea last month--the first by a French chief of state since Guinean independence--was of historic importance for this former breakaway French colony and long-time opponent of French policies in black Africa. The visit capped a three-year-old rapprochement process between the two countries and underscored Guinean President Toure's new openness toward the West, after 20 years of stormy relations with France and heavy reliance on the Soviet Union. The way has been cleared for increased Franco-Guinean economic, scientific, technical, and political cooperation.

Franco-Guinean relations have been turbulent for most of the period since 1958 when Toure led Guinea to independence after 95 percent of its people declared themselves independent of France and rejected membership in French President De Gaulle's proposed Franco-African community. All other francophone states of former French black Africa opted for independence in 1960 in close partnership with France. Guinea's break with France led to a brusque and wholesale French withdrawal from the country--including the widely reported removal of the Guinean telephone system--which greatly aggravated anti-French sentiment there. Guinea thereupon viewed France as its principal "imperialist" enemy, as Toure sought to achieve a social and political revolution aimed at transforming Guinea into a modern socialist state.

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Both Paris and Conakry have drawn their own conclusions about the consequences of the rupture. The sometimes visionary, sometimes pragmatic Toure has realized that his almost exclusive cooperation with the socialist countries has born little fruit; the level of development in potentially rich Guinea compares poorly with that of its neighbors in francophone Senegal and Ivory Coast.

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Toure has no intention of breaking with the socialist path he has chosen. But loans, investments, and Western experts are more welcome, and Toure now seems to regard France as a privileged partner in the area of economic development. During the past two years, Toure has been carrying out a slow evolution designed to rebuild the Guinean economy and attract Western capital without discouraging aid from the Socialist countries.

[REDACTED]

In addition to France's cultural and linguistic ties with Guinea and interest in its natural resources, which include about one-third of the world's bauxite and considerable agricultural potential, Paris is interested in sponsoring Guinea's return to the "family circle" of French-speaking countries. Giscard also wants to polish his "progressive" credentials by showing that France can draw closer to African "progressives" like Angola, Madagascar, Ethiopia, Benin, and now Guinea. Talk of a peculiarly different "African" form of development that eschews both Communism and capitalism fits into Giscard's grand design of a "European-African" association which he believes will help keep Africa free from superpower rivalries.

During the recent visit, the two presidents agreed that negotiations would begin before next March to develop concrete agreements concerning economic and technical cooperation, financial relations, and cultural and scientific exchanges. In welcoming Giscard, Toure spoke of Guinea's desire to benefit from French technology and capital investment in mixed enterprises. He said that Guinea did not intend to fix any limit on bilateral economic cooperation with France so long as it contributed to Guinea's chosen path of socialist development. Giscard implied in his public remarks that substantial French material assistance would be forthcoming, but such aid may not be nearly as large as the Guineans hope for.

It appears that French economic support to Guinea will at least be doubled. The French have set aside \$200,000 to be used for a quick, highly visible economic project to symbolize French cooperative intentions. The French Government reportedly intends to increase its annual \$2 million technical assistance program by 10 to 15 percent per year. This is to be supplemented by

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another \$2 million in aid for equipment, construction, and other projects. Export insurance loans covering the sale of French goods to Guinea is also to be increased from \$20 to \$60 million. [REDACTED]

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The future financial relationship between Guinea and France could well take the form of a French line of credit. It seems unlikely that Guinea, which wants to maintain the appearance of economic independence, will move soon toward full membership in the French-sponsored African Financial Community in which most other ex-French territories participate. Some form of Guinean association with the African franc zone, however, cannot be ruled out. [REDACTED]

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Although the two sides reportedly discussed the possibility of French training for Guinean Air Force pilots, no military agreements apparently resulted from Giscard's visit. Last year, Guinea turned to Paris for military equipment for the first time since 1958 when it bought two naval patrol boats from France. There are reports that Guinea may have acquired two additional French craft. [REDACTED]

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Giscard expects to consult periodically with Toure, who is the dean of African heads of state and fancies himself an African elder statesman, particularly on questions of intra-African coordination and European-African relations. The two presidents also talked about foreign interference in African affairs, a subject on which Guinea has lately become considerably more evenhanded in reaction to massive Soviet and Cuban involvement in the Horn of Africa. [REDACTED]

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It is unclear how hard Giscard may have pressed Toure on Guinea's poor human rights record. The French said that "all subjects" had been touched upon in the 10 hours of conversation between the two presidents, but there was no public reference to human rights. Toure is said to have freed at least five political prisoners married to French citizens as a gesture of good will to the French and the release of one of the most prominent Guineans in custody, Archbishop Tchidimbo of Conakry, who has dual nationality, may be imminent. [REDACTED]

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Nonetheless, much of the French press viewed the visit with wariness and some reservation. Liberal columnist Raymond Aron observed that Giscard "in exchanging handshakes and embraces with a despot whose only rival on the African continent was Idi Amin" compromised the dignity of the first magistrate of the French republic. Le Monde noted Toure's recent categorization of Amnesty International as "rubbish" and warned about the dangers of counting on the good will of dictators or autocrats. Toure, for his part, has blamed the French press for the "wall of misunderstanding" that has blocked Franco-Guinean reconciliation in the past. [REDACTED]

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Despite these polemics, France last year once again became Guinea's principal supplier, providing 22 percent of its imports. Important contracts have been signed since 1975, when diplomatic relations were restored, and the number of French teachers and technicians in 1978 reached over 800. Yet there is resistance in France to too close an identification with the Guinean regime and given Toure's personality, his trek back toward the francophone countries is bound to have its ups and downs. [REDACTED]

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Home Rule for Greenland



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The Greenland electorate is expected to approve home rule in a referendum on 17 January. Greenlanders, who have been governed from Copenhagen for centuries, will make local economic and social decisions, while the Danish national government will continue to handle foreign policy, including Greenland's relations with NATO. Opposition to the small US-NATO presence has not been a part of the drive for self-determination and is not expected to develop.



The Big Island

Greenland is a large, inclement, strategically located island. The 50,000 people, of mixed Inuit and Danish blood, live in scattered towns and settlements along the coast. The environment and poor communications have inhibited the society's development.



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Danish subsidies provide more than half of the island's income, with the rest coming from small-scale fishing, hunting, and mining. Reports in recent years that Greenland has great mineral wealth raised hopes of economic independence and fueled the drive for home rule, especially among young Greenlanders who make up a large proportion of the population. Exploratory oil drilling--which held the greatest near-term promise--was recently stopped, however, because no oil was found.



25X1

Centuries of poverty have had an adverse impact on Greenlanders' social and political development. The absence of an adequate economic base, lack of well-trained administrators, and widespread social problems such as alcoholism and venereal disease suggest to some Greenlanders that the population is not yet ready for greater autonomy. Other political leaders, who have come to the fore as spokesmen for the island on the issue of "made-in-Copenhagen" rule, believe that self-determination will develop the pride and self-confidence needed to combat the social problems.



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25X1 The schedule and program for home rule should allow the island to succeed in running its own affairs. The plan provides for a very gradual assumption of governmental responsibility, a government structure compatible with local custom, a continuation of subsidies at their present level, and a role for Copenhagen in making decisions on issues such as technology, investment, and international relations. [REDACTED]

Island Politics

Most Greenlanders prefer socialist political philosophies, and Greenland's two Folketing representatives have been counted in the Social Democratic camp since Greenland became a Danish county in 1953. The three political movements that are now being converted into parties are all socialist. [REDACTED]

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25X1 The party representing the more conservative voters is the Atassut. It was formally organized just before the February 1977 Folketing election and, like the Siumut--founded in 1971--has supported independent candidates in local and national campaigns. When they become parties, they will present their own candidates and formulate party platforms for elections to the new local legislature as well as for the Folketing in Copenhagen. [REDACTED]

25X1 Popular characterization of the Siumut as the party of the left and the Atassut as representing the right is a reflection of the mix of Greenland nationalism and Danish association each espouses. The question of whether all Danes or only Greenlanders own the mineral resources in Greenland is an important element in the debate. The first claims on income from resources, however, would be to replace the annual Danish budget subsidy and provide a return on the large investment necessary for exploitation. [REDACTED]

25X1 The smallest and newest political movement, Inuit Ataqatihit or Society for Eskimo Fellowship, has existed as a cultural society for a number of years. It is further to the left in the traditional political sense and also in its support for Greenland separatism. The Inuit Ataqatihit is organized on Marxist-Leninist principles and advocates a federation of native Arctic peoples from

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several countries. It is a very youthful group with some potential toward violence, which undercuts the support it could attract from most of the population. [REDACTED]

25X1

EC Participation

The Greenland legislature will elect a five-person administrative body which, as part of its domestic responsibilities, will decide Greenland's relationship to the EC. A key problem will be fishing rights. EC members pool fishing rights in their maritime zones, an aspect of membership which will be a hardship to Greenland because it allows several technologically advanced continental fishing fleets to compete on an equal footing with inefficient native fishermen. Greenland is expected to ask for special exceptions for its fishing grounds as a condition to retaining EC membership. Godthaab could, however, decide to withdraw from the EC, following somewhat the example of the Faeroe Islands, which have had home rule under Danish sovereignty since 1948 and have not participated in the EC. Greenland, however, has a lot to gain by continuing the association. As a developing area, the island receives aid from the EC and will also need outside help in patrolling its large maritime zone. [REDACTED]

25X1

The NATO Presence

The small scattered missile, aircraft, and maritime detection sites and air strips have made a positive contribution to Greenland communications and had little or no adverse impact on the island. The questions that are occasionally voiced by Greenland nationalists are usually blunted by consideration of other, more immediate, issues. When they think about it--and it is not a major preoccupation--Greenlanders realize they occupy a strategic location, and military interest in their region comes from both directions. Given a choice, they prefer the status quo to an unfamiliar presence. [REDACTED]

25X1

The tax and duty responsibilities of the legislative body--the Landsting--may cause more contention than anti-militarism or nationalism, as the politicians look around for painless revenue sources. [REDACTED]

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25X1 changing requirements could give the Greenlanders opportunities to apply new taxes or duties even though Copenhagen retains the policy aspects of the NATO relationship. [REDACTED]

Outlook

Home rule will undoubtedly give Greenlanders pride and self-confidence, but the problems imposed by the environment and poverty will not be solved soon. The promised mineral riches and the potential of the very young population will not produce significant income increases in this century. Greenlanders will continue to resent outsiders living among them who have higher wages and status living, but expanding home rule will not eliminate that because trained outsiders are needed to develop Greenland's wealth and labor force. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1 The Soviets, on hearing of Greenland's approaching self-determination, put in a bid for closer relations through trade in exchange for fishing licenses. The request was denied, not for political reasons--although few, if any, Greenlanders look to Moscow for political support--but because Greenland wants to eliminate rather than expand technologically advanced fishing fleets in their waters. [REDACTED]

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